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Abstract
Although past research has documented the prevalence of misconceptions in introductory psychology classes, few studies have
assessed how readily upper-level undergraduate and graduate students endorse erroneous beliefs about the discipline. In Study 1,
we administered a 30-item misconception test to an international sample of 670 undergraduate, master’s, and doctoral students.
Analyses indicated that participants identified and rejected the majority of misconceptions, with doctoral students performing
better than their master’s or undergraduate peers. In Study 2, we administered a revised version of our questionnaire to a novel
sample of 557 students while controlling for number of years spent at university, psychology courses completed, and need for
cognition. Once again, we found that graduate students rejected more, affirmed less, and reported lower levels of uncertainty
than their undergraduate counterparts. Educational implications and future research directions are discussed.
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Students new to the study of psychological science often come
equipped with preinstructional knowledge and beliefs that are
incongruent with the core concepts and empirical findings of the
discipline (Kowalski & Taylor, 2009; Thompson & Zamboanga,
2004). Undergraduates frequently endorse a variety of inaccu-
rate claims that lack empirical support, such as People only use
10% of their brain, It’s better to express anger than to hold it in
and Playing Mozart to babies increases their intelligence
(Herculano-Houzel, 2002; Higbee & Clay, 1998; Lilienfeld,
Lynn, Ruscio, & Beyerstein, 2009). These misconceptions have
been argued to stem from exposure to inaccurate or incomplete
information in the popular media (Lewandowsky, Ecker, Seifert,
Schwarz & Cook, 2012), instruction and textbooks that present
an oversimplification of concepts (Chew, 2006; Stanovich,
2009), and a range of cognitive factors such as confirmatory
bias, inferring causation from correlation and post hoc, ergo
propter hoc reasoning (see Lilienfeld et al., 2009).
Over the past several decades, three issues have come to
dominate the study of psychological misconceptions (for a
recent review, see Hughes, Lyddy, & Lambe, 2013). On one
hand, the vast majority of work has sought to document how
readily the general public (Furnham & Hughes, 2014; Green,
Page, Rasekhy, Johnson, & Bernhardt, 2006), students
(McCutcheon, 1991; Standing & Huber, 2003), and faculty
(Gardner & Hund, 1983) affirm erroneous claims about the dis-
cipline. This work has primarily centered on undergraduate
(introductory) students who have been found to vary dramati-
cally in the number of misconceptions that they endorse
(McCutcheon, 1991; Standing & Huber, 2003). Such large var-
iations from study to study may in part reflect sampling differ-
ences (Kuhle, Barber, & Bristol, 2009), the measurement
procedures employed (Hughes, Lyddy, & Kaplan, 2013), the
amount of disciplinary training students received (Gardner &
Dalsing, 1986; Lamal, 1979) as well as their critical thinking
ability (Kowalski & Taylor, 2004).
On the other hand, researchers have also attempted to iden-
tify key variables and potential strategies for undermining com-
mon misconceptions in the classroom. Much of this work has
been driven by the assumption that misconceptions negatively
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impact the learning of new information (although this claim
currently appears to rest more on theoretical conjecture than
empirical evidence; see Hughes, Lyddy, & Lambe, 2013). Gen-
erally speaking, these studies have shifted the empirical agenda
away from questions concerning the prevalence of misconcep-
tions—and their potential origins—toward the factors neces-
sary for their change, such as refutational teaching strategies
(Kowalski & Taylor, 2009) and critical thinking skills
(McCutcheon, Apperson, Hanson, & Wynn, 1992). Finally,
and in light of the fact that misconceptions are responsive to
correction when certain conditions are met, researchers have
attempted to articulate why this change occurs. A number of
theoretical models have been offered to explain how miscon-
ceptions should be conceptualized, why they are resistant to
correction, and the conditions necessary for successful learning
(Hammer & Elby, 2002; Reif, 1995). Of these models, concep-
tual change currently represents the dominant theoretical posi-
tion in the literature (Limo´n &Mason, 2002). According to this
model, revising or restructuring currently held inaccurate
beliefs is essential for optimal learning in any given discipline
(see diSessa, 2006). When taken together, the above-mentioned
work suggests that the tendency to hold inaccurate beliefs
about psychology (e.g., ‘‘Carefully controlled research is not
necessary for solving psychological problems’’) as well as spe-
cific disciplinary information (e.g., ‘‘The polygraph test is an
accurate detector of lies’’) is a prevalent, persistent, and poten-
tially problematic behavior.
The Current Research
Although the above-mentioned work shines a light on the pre-
valence of misconceptions, as well as the factors responsible
for their formation and change, it is nonetheless limited in one
key respect: The primary focus has been on undergraduate
(introductory) students new to the discipline. Consequently,
this analytic strategy is one that remains comparatively silent
to the persistence of misconceptions and their adoption by stu-
dents with many years of training in the core concepts and
empirical findings of the field. With this in mind, we set out
to expand the misconception literature beyond the borders of
the introductory psychology classroom and to determine
whether upper-level undergraduate and graduate students also
fall prey to erroneous claims. This may be an important issue
for the latter group, given that they often serve in a teaching
capacity (e.g., lab instructor, teaching assistant, or lecturer)
within university and college settings. Those graduate students
who subscribe to psychological misconceptions may inadver-
tently propagate them to the next generation of students and
thus represent one potential source of misinformation. Indeed,
this assumption appears to be consistent with recent findings
suggesting that 38% of students explicitly attribute their mis-
conceptions to what they learned in one of their psychology
courses or from their instructor (Landau & Bavaria, 2003; see
also Kowalski & Taylor, 2004).
To our knowledge, only two published studies have exam-
ined misconception endorsement in advanced members of the
discipline. Investigating common misconceptions in college
faculty, Gardner and Hund (1983) found that educators who
possessed doctoral level training were significantly more
likely to recognize and reject misconceptions compared to
those with master’s level training. Likewise, master’s students
have been found to hold significantly fewer misconceptions
compared to undergraduate students (Arntzen, Lokke, Lokke,
& Eilertsen, 2010). However, Gardner and Hund (1983)
focused primarily on misconceptions held by faculty and
Arntzen, Lokke, Lokke, and Eilertsen (2010) on misconcep-
tions about behavior analysis. In contrast, the current research
represents the first attempt to examine general misconceptions
about psychology in doctoral, master’s, and undergraduate
psychology students.
Study 1
Method
Participants
An international sample of 670 psychology students were
recruited from a large society focusing on social and personal-
ity psychology (466 women and 204 men) and participated in
this study on a voluntary basis. Participants ranged in age from
18 to 53 years (M ¼ 27, SD ¼ 5.3). We only included data for
students who were currently working toward the completion of
a psychology undergraduate (n ¼ 49), master’s (n ¼ 83), or
doctoral level qualification (n ¼ 538). Of the total sample,
23% were born in countries outside North America and 14%
were currently studying outside North America.
Measures
Psychology misconception questionnaire. To examine the preva-
lence of inaccurate beliefs about psychology, we developed a
30-item online misconception questionnaire. We only included
items clearly classified as misconceptions from previous work
(e.g., Kowalski & Taylor, 2009; Lilienfeld et al., 2009). Parti-
cipants rated each item using a 7-point scale ranging from 1
(strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) with 4 as a midpoint
(neither agreement nor disagreement). Unlike the traditional
true/false response format employed elsewhere, the above-
mentioned scale allowed students to indicate whether they
strongly, moderately, or slightly agreed/disagreed with a test
item. It also provided a means for them to report uncertainty
in any case where they were unsure about a given question.
In this study, we considered a misconception as being rejected
when participants reported any level of disagreement (slight,
moderate, or strong) and as being endorsed when they reported
any level of agreement with a test item.
Procedure
Students were invited via e-mail to complete an online survey
‘‘pertaining to knowledge about psychological information.’’
Interested participants visited a website and completed a
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consent form. They then provided demographic information
regarding their gender, age, academic year, and completed the
misconception questionnaire. Following the task, an informa-
tion sheet was presented that informed students about the
nature of the study and thanked them for their time.
Results
Our first aim was to examine the extent to which students
subscribe to false psychological claims. We calculated three
overall scores corresponding to the average number of miscon-
ceptions that they endorsed, rejected, or reported uncertainty
about. Any level of agreement (slight, moderate, or strong) was
interpreted as reflecting endorsement of a test item, while any
level of disagreement was taken to indicate misconception
rejection. On average, participants correctly rejected 57% of
misconceptions (M ¼ 17.1, SD ¼ 11.0), incorrectly endorsed
30% of the misconceptions (M ¼ 9.1, SD ¼ 7.3), and reported
uncertainty about 13% of the test items (M¼ 3.9, SD¼ 3.7; see
Table 1 for an overview of misconception scores for undergrad-
uate, master’s, and doctoral students).
Education and Misconception Recognition
In order to examine whether students with greater disciplinary
training endorse fewer erroneous claims, we divided partici-
pants into three groups (undergraduate, master’s, and PhD) and
submitted their scores to a 3 (misconception: endorsement vs.
rejection vs. uncertainty)  3(student type: undergraduate vs.
Master’s vs. PhD) repeated-measures analysis of variance
(ANOVA) with the former factor manipulated within and
the latter factor between participants. Analyses revealed a main
effect for misconception, F(2, 667) ¼ 331.62, p < .001, Zp2 ¼
.33, as well as a two-way interaction between misconception
and student type, F(4, 667) ¼ 9.94, p < .001, Zp2 ¼ .03, sug-
gesting that misconception recognition varied significantly
across the three student groups. Follow-up one-way ANOVAs
indicated that students differed in the number of items that they
rejected, F(2, 669) ¼ 10.87, p < .001, Zp2 ¼ .03, with doctoral
students (M¼ 18.81, SD¼ 5.83) disagreeing with significantly
more misconceptions than either master’s (M ¼ 17.13, SD ¼
6.11, p ¼ .04) or undergraduate students (M ¼ 15.22, SD ¼
3.11; p ¼ .001). A significant effect also emerged for miscon-
ception endorsement, F(2, 669) ¼ 13.65, p < .001, Zp2 ¼ .04,
with doctoral students (M ¼ 7.37, SD ¼ 4.39) affirming fewer
items than their counterparts in the master’s (M ¼ 9.34, SD ¼
5.75; p ¼ .002) and undergraduate conditions (M ¼ 10.51,
SD ¼ 5.33; p < .001). Interestingly, and unlike the doctoral
group, master’s students failed to reject more (p ¼ .19) or
affirm significantly less (p ¼ .55) misconceptions than their
undergraduate peers. Finally, undergraduate and graduate stu-
dents did not differ in the number of misconceptions that they
reported uncertainty about (p ¼ .52).1
Brief Discussion
In Study 1, we sought to track the prevalence of misconceptions
beyond the borders of introductory psychology and, in particu-
lar, to examine whether advanced undergraduate and graduate
students also embrace erroneous claims about the discipline.
Based on previous findings, we anticipated that upper-level
undergraduate and graduate students would both endorse mis-
conceptions about the discipline, with the latter group affirming
fewer and rejecting significantly more than the former. Our
results broadly support this conclusion.Of the 30misconceptions,
undergraduates agreedwith only35% of itemsonaverage, a num-
ber consistentwith other published studies (e.g., 39.5%:Vaughan,
1977; 38%: Gardner & Dalsing, 1986; 34–61%: Taylor &
Kowalski, 2004). While graduate students also endorsed several
inaccurate claims about the discipline, on average, they rejected
the vast majority of misconceptions. Consistent with past work
(Gardner & Hund, 1983), doctoral students were less likely to
affirm erroneous claims about psychology compared to either
undergraduates or master’s students. However, in contrast to
Arntzen et al. (2010), we found no significant difference in mis-
conception endorsement between master’s and undergraduate
students.When interpreting these findings, the difference in sam-
ple sizes for each group must be considered; the majority of our
respondents were doctoral level students. Furthermore, because
data were collected via an online survey, it remains possible that
participants had access to information that might influence their
performance on our questionnaire. Completion of a similar task
in a controlled setting would be necessary before strong conclu-
sions about the prevalence of misconceptions can be drawn.
Nevertheless, this study has, for the first time, provided an
indication of the approximate proportion of misconceptions
endorsed by doctoral, master’s, and undergraduate students and
enabled a comparison to be made between these three groups. It
remains to be seen, however, why doctoral students are less
likely to endorse misconceptions of a psychological nature.
We offer three different possible explanations. First, more
training in the core concepts and scientific tools of the disci-
pline may equip students with better critical thinking skills, and
these skills have been shown to play a role in reducing miscon-
ceptions (Kowalski & Taylor, 2004). From this perspective,
regardless of whether graduate training in psychology confers
students with additional content-specific knowledge, such
Table 1. Study 1: Means, Standard Deviation, and Percentage of
Misconceptions That Undergraduate, Master’s, and Doctoral Students
Agreed, Disagreed, and Reported Uncertainty About.
Misconception Scores
Undergraduate Master’s Doctoral
M SD % M SD % M SD %
Strongly disagree 6.3 5.3 21 7.3 5.2 24 8.9 5.6 30
Moderately disagree 4.8 2.9 16 6.2 3.1 21 6.1 3.1 20
Slightly disagree 4.1 2.6 14 3.7 2.5 11 3.9 2.8 13
Unsure 4.3 3.7 14 3.5 3.7 12 3.8 3.7 13
Slightly agree 6.0 3.0 20 5.4 3.7 18 4.8 3.4 16
Moderately agree 3.4 2.6 11 2.9 2.5 10 2.0 2.0 6
Strongly agree 1.1 1.7 4 1.1 1.7 4 .6 1.2 2
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training enhances students’ appreciation that critical analysis of
the literature is necessary before they can agree with any spe-
cific statement. Second, it is possible that graduate students
possess more content-specific knowledge than their undergrad-
uate counterparts and it is this knowledge that enables them to
confidently reject inaccurate claims. Finally, students who pur-
sue graduate training may differ in how they evaluate claims
and the evidence for those claims. They might also develop a
general bias toward disagreeing with any overarching state-
ment, given the complexity of psychological phenomena and
the fact that empirical findings are often subject to further qua-
lification. It is to these latter two possibilities that we now turn.
Study 2
One limitation of Study 1 was that every item in the misconcep-
tion survey was keyed in the same direction. It is therefore dif-
ficult to know whether the obtained outcomes reflected
students’ actual beliefs about survey content or methodological
confounds such as demand compliance (e.g., ‘‘this is a test
about common misconceptions thus I should disagree with
everything regardless of what I believe’’), a wholesale ten-
dency toward disagreement in general or some unconsidered
property of the procedure. To address this issue, we revised our
misconception questionnaire in three different ways and admi-
nistered it to a novel sample of students. First, we included a
number of factually correct statements to determine whether
graduate students differ in the amount of content-specific
knowledge they possess relative to their undergraduate peers.
This modification also enabled us to determine whether gradu-
ate students would agree (rather than simply disagree) with an
overarching statement about psychology when it was supported
by a large body of evidence (e.g., ‘‘Frequent exposure to a sti-
mulus causes people to like it more’’). Second, we revised the
questionnaire, so that a correct response on half of the items
required ‘‘True’’ to be selected (e.g., ‘‘A person’s positive
thoughts cannot stave off cancer’’), whereas a correct response
on the other half required ‘‘False’’ to be selected (e.g., ‘‘Some
people are left-brained and others are right-brained’’). If grad-
uate students genuinely endorse fewer misconceptions than
their undergraduate counterparts, then any differences between
the two groups should not be moderated by question phrasing.
Third, we opted for a true/false response format that also
included an ‘‘Unsure’’ option to accommodate respondent
uncertainty.
Participants in Study 1 were asked for their highest educa-
tional attainment (e.g., master’s Year 1, PhD Year 3) rather
than the number of psychology courses completed. Conse-
quently, students at the same educational level (PhD Year 1)
may have differed considerably in their disciplinary training
(e.g., 3 vs. 30 psychology courses). Our initial sample was also
recruited from a social/personality society and may have over-
represented specific areas within the discipline. With this in
mind, Study 2 controlled for psychological training and number
of years spent in university and included students from all areas
of the discipline (e.g., clinical, health, cognitive psychology).
These adjustments will serve to increase the generalizability
of our findings.
Finally, it may be that specific cognitive and/or personality
characteristics of students play a role in how susceptible they
are to misconceptions. For instance, students who opt for grad-
uate training may differ in how they evaluate claims (and the
evidence for those claims) relative to their undergraduate peers.
It is also possible that there are important individual differences
between undergraduate students—regardless of how many psy-
chology courses that have completed—that predict the likeli-
hood of misconception endorsement. In order to test this
assumption, we administered the Need for Cognition (NFC)
Scale (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982) immediately after the miscon-
ception questionnaire. The NFC Scale assesses the propensity
to engage in effortful and complex thinking. Individuals who
score highly on this measure are more likely to search for addi-
tional information before making a decision, less likely to be
influenced by blatant attempts at priming, and tend to think
more about a wide variety of topics—including their own
thoughts—than their low-scoring counterparts (see Petty,
Brin˜ol, Loersch, & McCaslin, 2009). It might be that a disposi-
tion for engaging in and enjoying effortful thinking buffers
against misconception endorsement. To our knowledge, no
research has explored the potential relation between individual
differences in need for cognition and susceptibility to psycho-
logical misconceptions.
Method
Participants
A convenience sample of 586 students (458 women, 128 men)
ranging in age from 18 to 55 years (M ¼ 21.3, SD ¼ 4.2) were
recruited from 4 North American universities. Fifty-one per-
cent were Asian American, 31% were European American, and
17% were of Hispanic American ethnicity. Mean years spent in
university was 2.6 (SD ¼ 1.9) and the median number of psy-
chology classes taken was 4. Although undergraduate students
participated in exchange for course credit, graduate students
completed the questionnaire on a voluntary basis. Data were
only included for students who were working toward the com-
pletion of a psychology undergraduate (n¼ 519), master’s (n¼
7), or doctoral level qualification (n ¼ 31) and had not partici-
pated in Study 1 (final N ¼ 557).
Measures
Psychology Misconception Questionnaire. A modified version of
the Psychology Misconception Questionnaire (PMQ) was
employed, which differed from its predecessor in three ways.
We expanded the task from 30 to 42 items—7 of which con-
sisted of factually correct statements (e.g., ‘‘The human brain
can be sub-divided into four different lobes’’). The remaining
35 items were split so that True and False were correct answers
about half of the time. An option of Unsure was also included.
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NFC scale. NFC was assessed using the short (18-item) version
of the scale. Participants responded to statements such as ‘‘The
notion of thinking abstractly is appealing to me’’ and ‘‘Learn-
ing new ways to think doesn’t excite me very much’’ (reverse
scored) using a response format that ranged from 4 (very
strong disagreement) to 4 (very strong agreement) with 0 as
a neutral point (neither agree nor disagree).
Procedure
Students received notification of an online survey ‘‘pertaining
to knowledge about psychological information’’ via an e-mail
announcement or a departmental recruitment system. Those
who agreed to participate were forwarded to a web page that
asked them to provide demographic information and complete
the PMQ as well as NFC scale. Thereafter, students were
thanked, debriefed, and dismissed. The entire task took less
than 1 hr to complete.
Results
We calculated three overall scores for each student correspond-
ing to the average number of misconceptions they endorsed,
rejected, or reported uncertainty about. As noted earlier, to
reject a misconception, participants had to select False on half
of the test items (e.g., ‘‘Some people are left-brained and others
are right-brained’’) and True on the other half (e.g., ‘‘People
with schizophrenia do not have multiple personalities’’). To
simplify analyses, we reverse scored the latter set of items,
so that a true response always indicated misconception endor-
sement, while a false response indicated misconception rejec-
tion. Finally, and given the relatively small number of
master’s students in the current sample, we collapsed both mas-
ter’s and PhD students into one overarching group (graduate
students).
To determine whether performance on the misconception
questionnaire varied as a function of psychological training,
we submitted the above-mentioned data to a 3 (misconception:
endorsement vs. rejection vs. uncertainty)  2 (student type:
graduate vs. undergraduate) repeated measures ANOVA. Anal-
yses revealed a main effect for misconception, F(2, 554) ¼
191.20, p < .001, Zp
2 ¼ .26, as well as a significant interaction
between misconception and student type, F(2, 554) ¼ 75.84,
p < .001, Zp
2 ¼ .12. To qualify this interaction, test scores for
both groups were submitted to a series of one-way ANOVAs.
Analyses revealed that graduate students rejected significantly
more misconceptions (M ¼ 27.1, SD ¼ 5.6) than their under-
graduate counterparts (M ¼ 16.3, SD ¼ 5.4), F(1, 555) ¼
141.09, p < .001, Zp
2 ¼ .20. At the same time, they also
endorsed fewer erroneous claims (M¼ 10.0, SD¼ 4.6) than the
latter group (M¼ 17.5, SD¼ 5.1), F(1, 555)¼ 75.49, p < .001,
Zp
2¼ .12, and responded with lower levels of uncertainty (M¼
4.9, SD ¼ 5.8) than undergraduate students (M ¼ 8.2, SD ¼
5.4), F(1, 555) ¼ 12.91, p < .001, Zp2 ¼ .02.
One possibility arising from Study 1 was that the observed
difference in questionnaire performance between undergradu-
ate and graduate students may have represented a response bias
on the part of the latter group toward rejecting overarching
statements about the discipline. If correct, then this tendency
should lead to clear differences between the two groups when
responding to factually correct items. When scores for the fac-
tually correct items were submitted to a similar set of analyses
as mentioned earlier, we found no difference between the two
groups in how much they endorsed those statements, (M ¼ 4.2,
SD ¼ 1.0, vs. M ¼ 4.2, SD ¼ 1.2), F(1, 555) ¼ .01, p ¼ .92. In
other words, instead of simply rejecting every item they
encountered, graduate and undergraduate students tended to
agree with the majority of claims about the discipline when
those statements were supported by a large body of empirical
evidence.2
Relationship between misconceptions, psychological training, years
spent at university, and NFC. Although we divided participants
into undergraduate and graduate students in order to compare
their performance on our questionnaire, such an approach
may mask important relationships between years spent at uni-
versity, psychology courses completed, need for cognition,
and susceptibility to misconceptions. Therefore, we computed
a correlation matrix that explored the relationship between
these various factors and misconception scores (see Table
2). Analyses revealed that disagreement with test items was
positively related to the amount of time spent at university and
to a lesser extent the number of psychology courses com-
pleted. An inverse set of correlations was evident for miscon-
ception endorsement, with participants more likely to agree
with (and report uncertainty about) misconceptions when they
had spent less time at university and completed fewer psy-
chology courses. Finally, students’ need for cognition scores
were positively correlated with misconception rejection,
greater number of psychology courses completed, and amount
of time spent at university.
Table 2. Study 2: Correlations Among All Variables of Interest.
Agree Unsure Time at University Psychology Courses Need for Cognition
Disagree .54 .56 .44 .38 .28
Agree .39 .29 .19 .11
Unsure .19 .22 .19
Time at university .49 .24
Psychology courses .14
Note. All scores are significant at the p < .01 level.
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Finally, to determine which of the above-mentioned factors
best predicted misconception endorsement, rejection, or uncer-
tainty, we carried out a series of hierarchical multiple regres-
sion analyses (the results of which are presented in Table 3).
In each case, the number of years spent at university was
entered in Step 1, psychological training in Step 2, and need for
cognition in Step 3. In conducting these analyses, we were able
to estimate the unique portion of variance that each variable
shared with misconception scores when controlling for all other
variables (main effects and interactions).
With respect to misconception rejection, years spent at uni-
versity predicted test performance at the first step, r2 ¼ .19,
F(1, 554) ¼ 131.38, p < .001. Entering psychological training
at the second step, R2 change ¼ .04, F(1, 553) ¼ 26.11, p <
.001, and need for cognition at the third step resulted in a sig-
nificant addition to the prediction of the model, for a total R2 of
.26, F(1, 552)¼ 22.29, p < .001, f2¼ .35. Interestingly, this pat-
tern of findings did not emerge for misconception endorsement.
While years spent at university did predict test performance at
the first step, r2 ¼ .08, F(1, 555) ¼ 50.32, p < .001, adding
psychological training and need for cognition offered no signif-
icant increase in the prediction of the model, R2 change ¼ .02,
F(1, 555) ¼ 1.05, p ¼ .31. With all three variables in the equa-
tion, time at university made a significant contribution to the
prediction of misconception agreement, t(552) ¼ 7.10, p <
.001, but psychological training, t(552) ¼ 1.56, p ¼ .12, and
need for cognition did not, t(552) ¼ 1.02, p ¼ .31. Put simply,
a greater number of years spent at university predicted the num-
ber of misconceptions participants agreed with above and
beyond the number of psychology courses they had completed
or their individual need for cognition.
Finally, entering time spent in university at the first step sig-
nificantly predicted misconception uncertainty, r2 ¼ .04, F(1,
554) ¼ 21.61, p < .001. Entering psychological training at the
second step, R2 change ¼ .02, F(1, 553) ¼ 12.35, p < .001, and
need for cognition at the third step resulted in a significant
addition to the prediction of the model, for a total R2 of .08,
F(1, 552) ¼ 13.11, p < .001, f2¼ .09. This time, with all three
variables in the equation, years spent at university did not make
a significant contribution to the prediction of misconception
uncertainty, t(552) ¼ 1.5, p < .12, but psychological training,
t(552) ¼ 3.5, p ¼ .001, and need for cognition did, t(552) ¼
3.6, p < .001. In other words, it appears that the number of psy-
chology courses completed and need for cognition predict how
frequently students report uncertainty about misconceptions,
above and beyond the time spent in university.
Brief Discussion
Consistent with Study 1, graduate students agreed with fewer,
disagreed with more, and reported lower levels of uncertainty
about misconceptions relative to their undergraduate counter-
parts. Both groups were equally likely to affirm general state-
ments about the discipline when those claims were factually
correct or supported by a large body of empirical evidence.
A series of correlational and regression analyses revealed
that as the number of years students spent at university
increased, the probability of agreeing with misconceptions
decreased—regardless of the number of psychology coursed
they had completed or their need for cognition. However,
including psychological training and need for cognition in
the model increased our ability to predict whether participants
disagreed or reported uncertainty about misconception items.
General Discussion
This article set out to address two interrelated questions. On
one hand, we were interested in whether common but inaccu-
rate beliefs about psychology would be endorsed by students’
new the discipline as well as those with extensive training in its
core concepts and values. Until recently, the vast majority of
work has focused on introductory students and very rarely
tracked misconceptions in upper-level undergraduate (Glass,
Bartels, Ryan, & Stark-Wroblewski, 2008) and graduate stu-
dents (Arntzen et al., 2010). Across two separate studies, we
provide converging evidence that students readily recognize
Table 3. Study 2: Results From Hierarchical Multiple Regression
Analyses Using Years Spent in University, Psychological Training, and
Need for Cognition to Predict Misconception Disagreement,
Agreement, and Uncertainty.
Misconception Step Predictor B
SE
B B T p
Disagreement 1 Years in
university
1.38 .12 .44 11.46 .001
2 Years in
university
1.03 .14 .33 7.61 .001
Psych courses .19 .04 .22 5.11 .001
3 Years in
university
.90 .14 .29 6.64 .001
Psych courses .19 .04 .22 5.11 .001
Need for
cognition
.05 .01 .18 4.72 .001
Agreement 1 Years in
university
.82 .12 .29 7.10 .001
2 Years in
university
.71 .13 .25 5.37 .001
Psych courses .06 .04 .07 1.58 .12
3 Years in
university
.69 .14 .24 5.05 .001
Psych courses .06 .04 .07 1.56 .001
Need for
cognition
.01 .01 .04 1.02 .30
Unsure 1 Years in
university
.56 .12 .19 4.64 .001
2 Years in
university
.32 .04 .16 3.48 .001
Psych courses .13 .04 .17 3.52 .001
3 Years in
university
.22 .14 .08 1.56 .12
Psych courses .13 .04 .16 3.48 .001
Need for
cognition
.04 .01 .15 3.62 .001
Note. SE ¼ standard error.
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and reject the majority of misconceptions that they encounter—
with graduates significantly better at doing so relative to under-
graduates. Nevertheless, it should be noted that undergraduates
continued to endorse a number of items in both of our studies
(35% in Study 1 and 50% in Study 2) as did their graduate peers
(31% in Study 1 and 29% in Study 2). Several possible expla-
nations present themselves. First, these scores could reflect
genuinely faulty beliefs about the discipline and if so, they
serve to underscore the difficulties in combating misconcep-
tions. Second, we cannot rule out the possibility that the
above-mentioned scores were influenced by features of the
measurement procedures themselves, such as item phrasing
or response format used (see Hughes, Lyddy, & Kaplan,
2013; Taylor & Kowalski, 2012). Finally, students may have
responded to a number of test items as being ‘‘partially incor-
rect but not entirely false’’ (e.g., Gardner & Brown, 2012). In
other words, several items on our questionnaire may contain
a ‘‘kernel of truth’’ or be true some of the time, but not gener-
ally. Consider, for example, the notion that ‘‘opposites attract.’’
Although it is entirely possible that minor differences between
romantic partners contribute to a more interesting and varied
relationship, people typically select mates that are similar to
themselves in personality, attitudes, and values (e.g., Buston
& Emlen, 2003; Hitsch, Hortac¸su, & Ariely, 2009).
We were curious to know whether misconceptions would
diminish as a function of university education and/or psycholo-
gical training. Consistent with past findings, more time spent in
university and the number of psychological courses completed
predicted higher levels of misconception rejection. However,
in contrast to Gardner and Dalsing (1986)—who found that
psychological training was a better predictor of misconceptions
than university education—we found that only the latter and
not the former predicted misconception endorsement. These
findings suggest that differences in domain-specific knowledge
may not be the reason why undergraduates affirm more mis-
conceptions relative to their graduate peers in Study 2. If mas-
ter’s and doctoral students simply acquired more information
about the discipline, psychological training should have pre-
dicted susceptibility to misconceptions above and beyond years
spent at university. Graduate students should also have
affirmed significantly more factually correct items than under-
graduates—yet this did not appear to be the case. Both groups
of students were effective in identifying and supporting test
items that were factually correct or supported by a large body
of evidence. Thus, it may be that generic skills acquired during
university—such as the ability to critically evaluate a knowl-
edge claim—are cultivated and practiced with increased fre-
quency as one advances from the initial stages of study to a
position of academic maturity. Although a firm answer to the
above-mentioned question lies beyond the remit of this article,
future work could set out to disentangle the specific properties
of university and psychological training that influence stu-
dent’s susceptibility to psychological misconceptions. More-
over, given that we relied on a small set of factually correct
statements in order to test domain-specific knowledge, future
work could also examine whether our findings continue to hold
when a more robust test with a larger set of factual items are
employed.
Our findings reveal that a propensity to engage in effortful
and complex thinking (i.e., a need for cognition) can also help
students detect misconceptions about psychology. Individuals
intrinsically motivated to evaluate the world around them and
seek out complex ideas or tasks were less susceptible to erro-
neous claims compared to those who would rather avoid effort-
ful cognitive work. However, it should be noted that need for
cognition bears more than a passing resemblance to another vari-
able that is central to misconception rejection (i.e., critical think-
ing). This latter factor broadly refers to a disposition toward and
ability to retrieve information to evaluate knowledge claims with
the goal of generating sound conclusions from that information
in a transcontextual fashion (see Halpern, 2007). Both need for
cognition and critical thinking predict academic performance
(Sadowski & Gulgoz, 1996; Williams, Oliver, & Stockdale,
2004), misconception endorsement (Kowalski & Taylor,
2004), and perhaps most importantly, correlate significantly with
one another (Stedman, Friedel, Rhoades, Ricketts, & Irani, 2009;
West, Toplak, & Stanovich, 2008). Although a number of
authors have explored critical thinking in the context of psycho-
logical misconceptions, this article is the first to connect need for
cognition to that same domain. Thus, it may be useful to clarify
the relationship between critical thinking and need for cognition
as well as identify strategies for their cultivation in situations
where they are absent. Taking a step back, this work also illus-
trates the utility of attending to specific cognitive or personality
variables that may influence a student’s likelihood of believing
inaccurate claims about the discipline. Such factors may serve
to highlight subsections of the student population that could ben-
efit from more intensive or directed educational efforts. For
example, it may be that need for cognition is only one of a pos-
sible myriad of individual differences that predict how readily
students affirmmisconceptions inside and outside the classroom.
Some final points are worth considering here. Although mis-
conceptions about mental illness, memory, and legal phenom-
ena may influence a host of ‘‘real-world’’ outcomes (Lilienfeld
et al., 2009), few researchers have sought to put this claim to
the test (although see Shaw & Woodworth, 2013). Given that
the prevalence and persistence of misconceptions have been
increasingly subject to empirical scrutiny, a logical next step
may be to conduct ‘‘translational’’ research that explicates the
link between specific misconceptions and real-world decision
making. For instance, do misconceptions about eyewitness tes-
timony, the ‘‘lie-detecting’’ abilities of the polygraph, or false
confessions increase the likelihood of a student punishing a
suspect in a ‘‘mock-crime’’ scenario when only the above
forms of evidence are offered? While misinformation about
childhood vaccines and autism has been shown to lead to
reductions in vaccination rates (Lewandowsky et al., 2012),
would students who endorse homeopathy or alternative medi-
cines recommend these treatments to other students in place
of traditional medicine? Similarly, do misconceptions about
mental illness influence how closely students sit beside, inter-
act with, or offer to help a confederate who was ‘‘diagnosed’’
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with schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, or clinical depression?
Each of the foregoing examples could be modified by educa-
tors for use in the classroom and demonstrate how misconcep-
tions can be leveraged as an engaging and vivid instructional
tool. Researchers could also create experimental measures
from these examples in order to investigate whether (a) mis-
conceptions inform and guide real-world biases, (b) interactive
strategies are an effective means of combating erroneous
beliefs, and (c) observed changes in misconceptions persist lon-
ger relative to other instructional strategies (e.g., Kowalski &
Taylor, 2009).
It is worth noting that the current findings are entirely corre-
lational in nature and were collected online via an open adver-
tisement (Study 1) or departmental sign-up system (Study 2).
Although such a design has obvious benefits (e.g., access to large
sample of psychology students from around the world), it is sub-
ject to several limitations including an inability to control access
to task-relevant information or even the duration of question-
naire completion. Indeed, given that a convenience sampling
method was used, far more graduate relative to undergraduate
students participated in Study 1 and vice versa in Study 2. In
addition, properties of the sample (ethnicity) in the latter study
were not representative of the student population as a whole.
With this in mind, future work could replicate the current find-
ings while systematically manipulating the above-mentioned
factors in a controlled (laboratory or classroom) setting. Doing
so would clarify the relative importance of general university
versus psychology-specific training in undermining erroneous
claims about the discipline. It would also serve to increase the
generalizability of our findings and ensure that they are not con-
strained to specific subsections of the student population.
Conclusion
In this article, we provide the first systematic analysis of the
prevalence of misconceptions as a function of educational
level, psychological training, and individual differences in
need for cognition. Overall, our results indicate that while inac-
curacies about the discipline diminish as students’ educational
experience increase, graduate students continue to endorse a
small number of misconceptions in the face of extensive disci-
plinary training (although it should be noted that students pur-
suing doctoral training appear to recognize and reject a greater
number of inaccuracies relative to their counterparts at the mas-
ter’s or undergraduate level). Given the persistence or ‘‘sticki-
ness’’ of common misconceptions about psychology, it is
entirely possible that graduate students (and even faculty) who
endorse pseudoscientific thinking and beliefs actually transmit
misconceptions to the next generation of students in their role
as teaching assistants, tutors, or lecturers. We therefore recom-
mend that further work investigate this possibility in addition to
the other potential sources of misconceptions that have been
identified (but not tested) in the wider literature (Lewandowsky
et al., 2012; Lilienfeld et al., 2009). Such work would provide
valuable insight into the potential sources of psychological
misconceptions—a necessary step for their elimination.
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Notes
1. Conducting the above-mentioned analyses with gender added as
an additional factor also resulted in a two-way interaction
between Misconception and Gender, F(2, 667) ¼ 9.69, p <
.001, Zp
2 ¼ .01, such that women affirmed more, F(1, 667) ¼
13.86, p < .001, Zp
2 ¼ .02, and rejected fewer misconceptions
compared to men, F(1, 667) ¼ 10.51, p ¼ .001, Zp2 ¼ .02. Note
that a three-way interaction between Misconceptions, Student
Type, and Gender was not observed.
2. It should be noted that a significant effect was also obtained for
the number of factually correct items graduate and undergraduate
students disagreed with (M ¼ 2.6, SD ¼ .89, vs. M ¼ 2.1, SD ¼
1.1), F(1, 555) ¼ 7.35, p ¼ .01, Zp2 ¼ .01, and reported uncer-
tainty about (M ¼ .26, SD ¼ .64, vs. M ¼ .77, SD ¼ 1.1),
F(1, 555) ¼ 8.42, p ¼ .01, Zp2 ¼ .02. However, we refrain from
making any strong claims in this particular instance, given that
the absolute magnitude of the mean differences and effect sizes
is so small they are practically meaningless.
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